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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
SPONTANEOUS DECLARATION
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

AS

EVIDENCE:

PREJUDICIAL

STATEMENTS

OF

The problem of whether or not a hearsay statement was admissible as a
spontaneous declaration, and the problem of fairness as raised by statements
of a prosecuting attorney tending to prejudice a jury against a defendant in
a murder trial, were considered in People v. Marks.'3 A reversal of a conviction of murder in the second degree was sought on the ground that the trial
court improperly excluded a statement of the victim, made six minutes after
the shooting, in which the victim accused a person other than defendant of
shooting him, and on the ground that the prosecutor made prejudicial statements in his summary to the jury. The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision,
affirming the Appellate Division and the Court of General Sessions of the City
of New York, held that the statement was not admissible under the spontaneous
declaration exception to the hearsay rule, 14 and that the behavior of the prosecuting attorney was not so prejudicial as to require a reversal of the judgment
and a new trial. Judge Desmond, speaking for the dissenting judges, argued
that the "gross impropriety of a prosecutor's 'making himself an unsworn
witness and supporting his case by his own veracity and position"' was sufficient to warrant a reversal and new trial.
A statement made to a person out of court cannot be offered by that
person in court as evidence of the truth of the matter contained in the statement. 15 Such a statement is hearsay, and it is traditionally objected to on the
ground that there is no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement by
cross-examination of the non-present declarant. The spontaneous declaration
exception to the hearsay rule, permits a hearsay statement to be admitted if it
was made so close in time to the event commented on, that there was insufficient time to fabricate a falsehood, provided no motive to misrepresent is
shown.' The statement in the Marks case, made six minutes after the shooting, failed to meet the test of nearness in time, and a motive to misrepresent
was shown. During the six minute period between the time the victim was
shot until he made his statement, the victim left the basement wherein he was
shot, climbed fifteen steps, walked over 150 feet, talked to a woman and gave
no indication that he thought he was dying. 17 The Court found,' 8 that "it
cannot be held that the Trial Judge erred as a matter of law in finding the
13. People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1959).
14. People v. Marks, 6 A.D.2d 677, 173 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1st Dep't 1958), motion granted
5 N.Y.2d 761, 179 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1958).
15.

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1912).

16. People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690 (1908).
17. The Court distinguished the victim's statement under these circumstances, and
said that it was not a dying declaration because the dedarant did not believe death was
near at hand. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). New York disfavors
the dying declaration exception. See People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 40 N.E.2d 48 (1949).
18. It should be noted that the Court rejected defendant's contention that the
question of spontaneity should have been submitted to the jury, and held that it is the
province of the court and not of the jury to decide preliminary questions of fact on which
the admissibility of the declaration depends.
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preliminary fact to be that the declaration of this homicidal victim lacked
spontaneity, and that sufficient time had elapsed under the circumstances so
that it could have been a reflective fabrication."'10 Since the victim did not
think he was dying, the Court found that he probably fabricated a false accusation to save himself from being shot again by the same person, the person
from whom the victim, a drug addict, had stolen several packages of heroin.
Failing to meet the definition of a spontaneous declaration, the statement was
properly excluded from evidence.
On summation, the defendant's attorney injected the personality of the
prosecuting attorney into the case by accusing him of suborning his drug addicted witnesses by threatening to withhold drugs from them. In turn, the
prosecuting attorney, it is said, "attempted to bolster the credibility of witnesses for the prosecution with the prestige of his office, character and personality." 2° No clear pattern emerges from the decisions on the point as to when
a conviction is to be reversed because of the misbehavior of the prosecuting
attorney. The interplay of a number of factors must be considered before the
court can find that "there has been a substantial infringement of the funda2
mental demand of our law that the defendant shall have a fair trial." ' It
would seem, if rules are to be formulated, that if the statements of a prosecuting attorney to a jury were "undignified and intemperate, containing improper
insinuations and assertions calculated to mislead the jury,122 and, if "the case
against [defendant] . .. may properly be characterized as weak... [fin these
circumstances prejudice to the cause of the accused is so highly probable that
we are not justified in assuming its non-existence." 23 On the other hand, if the
case against defendant had been strong, or, as some courts have said, the evi24
dence of his guilt 'overwhelming,' a different conclusion might be reached.
Where the prejudice is great,25 a reversal is proper. 20 In the Marks case, no
reversal and new trial were granted where the prejudice was not great in view
19. Supra note 13 at 76, 77, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 472 (1959).
20. Id. at 77, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 473 (1959).
21. People v. De Martine, 205 App. Div. 80, 88, 199 N.Y. Supp. 426, 433 (2d Dep't
1923). In this case both judge and prosecutor made prejudicial statements.
22. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1934).
23. Id. at 88, 89. In the Berger case the federal prosecutor misstated facts in his
cross-examination. Also People v. Burley, 282 App. Div. 408, 122 N.Y.S.2d 760 (4th
Dep't 1953), in which the prosecutor charged the defendant with sodomy, a crime not
charged in the indictment. Said the court, at 411, ". . .[ t]he question of guilt was a
very close one and great care should have been taken not to introduce into the trial
any extraneous facts or issues which would tend to create prejudice against the defendants
or arouse the disgust or passion of a jury.'
24. Supra note 21 at 89.
25. N.Y. CODE Cmma. PROC. § 542: "After hearing the appeal, the court must give
judgment, without regard to technical errors or defects or to exceptions which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties." Prejudicial statements may affect the substantial rights of parties if they affect the verdict. An error is substantial under § 542
if it influences the verdict, People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923).
26. People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 53 N.E. 497 (1899). A reversal and new trial
were granted because of the prosecutor's ". . . assertion . . . of facts not proved, . . .
inflammatory appeals to passion and prejudice, and . . . his threat to the jury of popular
denunciation, all under the sanction of the trial court."
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of the strong case presented against defendant by other evidence. While this
may be the present New York rule, it can be observed that Judge Desmond,
with two other Judges, has maintained that misconduct alone can be enough
for reversal. 27 Quoting an 1899 case to the effect that warnings unheeded led
to reversals where dangerous appeals continued to be made to juries,2 8 Judge
Desmond asks, in regard to the Marks case, "[W]hat possible remedy is there
but a reversal? . . . 'How long will you abuse the patience of this court?' "29

Perhaps the judicial climate is changing, and this is a "word to the wise."
IM-EACHMENT OF WITNESS WHO Is DRUG ADDICT

The question and extent of admissibility of expert evidence to show the
effect of drug addiction upon the credibility and competency of a witness is a
subject on which there is conflicting authority in American jurisdictions. "The
view adhered to by the majority of American jurisdictions is that testimony
as to narcotic addiction, or expert testimony as to the effects of such drugs, is
not considered admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness, unless followed by testimony tending to show that he was under the influence while
testifying, or when the events to which he testified occurred."8 0 The minority
view holds such evidence generally admissible for impeachment purposes.
Although there are numerous cases dealing with this problem,31 there is a
surprising lack of articulation of the underlying reasons for either exclusion or
2
admission.
The New York Court of Appeals,33 in passing on the question for the
first time, indicated an adherence to what is termed the majority American
view.
In People v. Williams, the defendant was convicted of feloniously selling
a narcotic drug to a person who became the State's chief witness against him.
At the trial, defense counsel arduously sought to attack the credibility of this
witness through his history of prior drug addiction. The witness had been
addicted to the use of heroin for about five years prior to the day of the sale
in question. He had had no drugs on that day, nor during the four months
period prior to the trial. Defense counsel attempted to introduce expert medical testimony regarding the effects of addiction upon the truthfulness of
addicts. Objections to the introduction of such testimony were sustained by
the Trial Judge, ruling that the witness' credibility was a matter for the jury.
27. Where prosecutor's prejudicial statements on summation warranted reversal
even though the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt, see People v. Swanson,
278 App. Div. 846, 104 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1951).
28. Supra note 13 at 79. The case was People v. Fielding, supra note 26 at 547.
29. Supra note 13 at 79. See People v. Lovello, 1 N.Y.2d 436, 154 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1956),
in which an illegal delay in arraignment, plus "... . serious and prejudicial error . . . made

by the
opinion
30.
31.
32.
33.

prosecutor in his summation" warranted a reversal. Judge Desmond wrote the
for a unanimous court.
Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1955).
See cases collected in note 30 supr4z; Annot, 15 A.L.R. 912 (1921).
See Note, 33 So. CAlIF. L. REv. 333 (1943).
6 N.Y.2d 18, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1959).
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